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Abstract
Recent work has put forth the hypothesis that adversarial
vulnerabilities in neural networks are due to them overus-
ing “non-robust features” inherent in the training data. We
show empirically that for PGD-attacks, there is a training
stage where neural networks start heavily relying on non-
robust features to boost natural accuracy. We also propose
a mechanism reducing vulnerability to PGD-style attacks
consisting of mixing in a certain amount of images contain-
ing mostly “robust features” into each training batch, and
then show that robust accuracy is improved, while natural
accuracy is not substantially hurt. We show that training on
“robust features” provides boosts in robust accuracy across
various architectures and for different attacks. Finally, we
demonstrate empirically that these “robust features” do not
induce spatial invariance.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have become
the tool of choice for image classification tasks. State-of-
the-art DNN models are able to achieve very high accura-
cies on standard datasets. However, the complexity of these
neural networks has resulted in human beings being un-
able to fully understand their training and inference pro-
cess, causing difficulties in interpreting certain counterin-
tuitive phenomena. One such phenomenon is the existence
of adversarial examples [3, 21], images that appear to hu-
mans to be obvious examples of a certain class ytrue of ob-
jects (e.g. ytrue = ‘cat’), but that the model assigns to a com-
pletely different class y f alse with very high confidence (e.g.
y f alse = ‘dog’ with 99% confidence). In some cases, even
simple low-dimensional transformations such as translation
or rotation can cause misclassification [8]. The existence
of adversarial examples [8, 10, 17], as well as numerous de-
fense schemes [5,15,19,23,25], has been well-studied. How-
ever, the mechanism underlying their existence is presently
not known.
Recent work by Ilyas et al. [13] has put forth the hypothe-
sis that the emergence of adversarial examples is due to the
supervised learning paradigm currently employed, which
solely aims to maximize categorical accuracy on natural
(unperturbed) images. More specifically, they propose that
each image class y may have two main kinds of features
associated with it: robust features, features that are clearly
indicative of class ytrue both to humans and to neural net-
works (e.g. the existence of fur or pointed ears), and non-
robust features, features that are strongly indicative of the
class ytrue, but are only meaningful to the neural network
and not to humans, to whom they may appear to be random
patterns. While non-robust features aid in boosting classifi-
cation accuracy, they are brittle, meaning that slight pertur-
bations to the image (imperceptible to humans) can com-
pletely transform the non-robust features to indicate a dif-
ferent class y f alse. The core idea is that such perturbations
to non-robust features are the root cause of the existence
of adversarial examples, and the dominant supervised learn-
ing paradigm causes neural networks to make heavy use of
non-robust features to maximize natural accuracy. Ilyas et
al. claim that this is the reason adversarial attacks tend to
transfer well among diverse neural network architectures.
Ilyas et al. constructed two special datasets to verify their
hypothesis: from a base dataset D containing natural im-
ages, they created a dataset DR containing images whose
non-robust features cannot be relied on to indicate their
class (i.e., their only useful features are robust) and a dataset
DNR containing images whose only useful features are non-
robust. DR is produced by using an adversarially-trained
classifier fA to distort a randomly selected image x′ to the
label y of a different image x. The intuition is that since fA
is adversarially trained, it will only distort the robust fea-
tures of x′ to the label y, leaving the non-robust features
untouched and thus not relevant to the class y. DNR is pro-
duced by constructing adversarial examples (whose non-
robust features, by definition, point to a class y f alse 6= ytrue,
but whose robust features point to ytrue) and relabeling them
to class y f alse.
More research is required to fully understand if Ilyas et
al.’s hypothesis holds, and if so, how and to what it applies.
This project aims to clarify and extend some aspects of Ilyas
et al.’s work by asking the following questions:
Question 1. Does the current supervised training
paradigm induce undesired utilization of non-robust
features?
We first ask whether it is possible that the current goal
of maximizing a classifier’s accuracy during training can
lead to the classifier “overfitting” to non-robust features,
i.e. primarily making use of robust features in the early
stages of training but heavily relying on non-robust fea-
tures later to bring classification accuracy to its peak
level. We design an experiment that snapshots training
progress at regular intervals, performs various adversar-
ial attacks, and then calculates the attack success rate
(ASR = number of adversarial examples wrongly classifiednumber of corresponding natural examples correctly classified ).
The intuition is that if neural networks first learn mainly ro-
bust features and only overfit to non-robust features in later
training stages, the ASR should be lower in earlier stages of
training.
Question 2. Can we further validate the idea of natural
images containing both robust and non-robust features?
To answer this question, we design a dataset Dmix contain-
ing (1) natural images of various classes from the original
dataset D and (2) images from DR. We train various classi-
fiers on this dataset and evaluate their robust accuracies for
various different attacks as well as their natural accuracies.
The intuition is that higher proportions of images from DR
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will lead to higher robust accuracies. Also, to eliminate the
concern of defense information leakage to the constructed
robust dataset [6], we evaluate the models trained on Dmix
with different attack methods. We expect that the robustness
induced by Dmix transfers well across different attack meth-
ods and architectures.
Question 3. Can PGD-robust datasets induce spatial
equivariance?
Ilyas et al. only examine projected gradient descent (PGD)
attacks [17] as a means of adversarial attack. We will there-
fore examine whether the “robust features” of [13] are also
robust against spatial attacks (such as translation and rota-
tion). In particular, if such features exist, they should (by
definition) induce a certain degree of equivariance to rota-
tion and translation attacks for the model.
To test this hypothesis, we train classifiers on DR
and perform spatial transformation attacks [8]. Since the
adversarially-trained classifier fA used to construct DR is
only known to be robust to PGD attacks [17], we also at-
tempt to construct spatially robust and non-robust datasets
DSR and D
S
NR using the same method as for DR and DNR, but
using special equivariance-inducing classifiers as fA .
Finally, we train networks which claim to achieve a
certain degree of spatial equivariance on DR to evaluate
whether training only on robust features causes these net-
works to achieve a higher degree of spatial equivariance
compared to training on natural images. The architectures
we use include the group equivariant network [4], spatial
transformer network [14], and a special case of equivariance
transformer models [9], the polar transformer network [22].
Contributions. Concretely, our contributions in this
work are the following insights into the claims made in [13]:
• We show that the current training goal of maximizing
accuracy on natural images is not in itself responsible
for overfitting to non-robust features. In fact, we show
that neural networks do not make a clear distinction be-
tween robust and non-robust features during training,
utilizing both from the very beginning of training.
• Previous work [25] has shown that there is often a
trade-off between natural accuracy and robust accu-
racy. We show empirically that we can achieve a boost
in robust accuracy by adding only a small amount
of images from DR to the training dataset without
perceptibly hurting natural accuracy. Furthermore, we
show that the robustness of classifiers trained on DR
transfers well among attacks based on different high-
dimensional perturbations as well as among different
architectures. We can therefore consider such mixed
datasets as a novel defense mechanism against adver-
sarial attacks.
• We attempt to apply the theories from [13] to the case
of spatial attacks, and find that their theories do not ap-
ply in the realm of low dimensional attacks. In partic-
ular, classifiers trained on DR exhibit worse spatial ro-
bustness than classifiers trained on D, even in the case
of spatially robust architectures.
2 Models and Methods
In this section, we go over the methods used to answer the
Questions 1, 2, and 3.
2.1 Attacks
In our work, we mainly study two major classes of attacks
(i.e. image perturbations): PGD attacks and spatial attacks.
The attack settings largelymirror those in [6,13]. We mainly
use these attacks for evaluation. The accuracy of a model
evaluated with adversarial examples generated by an attack
scheme A is called robust accuracy underA , while the orig-
inal evaluation using only natural images is termed natural
accuracy. We use various attack parameters for the specific
purpose of evaluating degrees of robustness for the different
models trained. The character of a model which enables it
to resist PGD or spatial attacks is called PGD robustness or
spatial robustness respectively.
PGD attacks Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks
are considered to be the strongest attacks which utilize the
first-order information of the network, as studied in [17].
We use two types of PGD attacks (ℓ2-PGD and ℓ∞-PGD)
which adopt different norms when bounding the attack
space: ℓ2-norm and ℓ∞-norm. The adversarial examples are
generated by perturbing the original images towards the gra-
dient ascent direction, while the gradient is normalized by
the constraint norm. The resulting perturbed image will be
projected back to the allowed image space, with the norm
of its difference from the original image constrained by a
parameter ε. This attack step can be performed for multiple
iterations.
For the ℓ2-PGD attack, our attack parameters follow [13].
We choose ε = 0.25 or 0.5, step size = 0.1 and we run
100 iterations to ensure that it is possible for the attack
step to reach the boundary. For the ℓ∞-PGD attack, apart
from following the attack settings in [17], we also set up
experiments of smaller ℓ∞boundary, i.e. weaker attacks, for
our own purposes of demonstration. In total, we have ε =
1
255 ,
2
255 ,
4
255 , and
8
255 with step size =
ε
4 and 7 steps of at-
tack.
Spatial attacks Spatial attacks are performed by generat-
ing rotated and/or translated images with the aim of caus-
ing misclassification. Previous work [8] has shown that a
high number of spatial adversarial examples can be found
through a grid search. There are infinitely many combina-
tions of rotation and translation possible for a spatial attack,
so we attempt to approximate this infinite number by dis-
cretizing the continuous space of rotations and translations
into a mesh containing all possible combinations of the dis-
cretized attack parameters. In particular, we use the follow-
ing grids in our work. (1) grid775, a grid with 5 values per
translation direction (vertical or horizontal) and 31 values
for rotation, yielding 775 images; (2) grid135, a grid with
3 values per translation direction and 15 values for rotation,
yielding 135 images (for these two grids, we use spatial lim-
its of at most 3px translation in either direction and 30◦ ro-
tation in either direction); (3) grid775,10◦ , the same as
grid775 but with at most 10◦ of rotation in either direction;
(4) rot30, the same as grid775 but with no translation; and
(5) rot10, the same as rot30 but with at most 10◦ of rota-
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tion in either direction.
Attacks (2)–(5) serve as a weaker version of grid775 to
allow for the appropriate evaluation of the spatial robustness
of certain models while avoiding being too strong to break
any model claiming to achieve a certain degree of spatial
robustness.
2.2 Datasets
The base dataset D we use throughout this work is CIFAR-
10 [16]. The datasets DR and DNR are derived from CIFAR-
10 and are freely available as part of [13]. Additionally, we
create a custom dataset Dmix. This dataset is designed such
that during training, a certain proportion α of each batch is
composed of randomly selected images from DR, while the
rest are randomly selected from D. One epoch is defined to
be over after 50000 images (the size of D).
2.3 Architectures
Main architectures In this work we mainly conduct ex-
periments with the ResNet architecture family [12], namely
ResNet-34 and ResNet-50. The VGG-16 [20] model and the
ResNet-18 model are used for the purpose of studying the
transferability of robustness which is induced byDR orDmix,
as the DR we used are constructed using ResNet-50 in [13].
Spatial equivariant networks To detect the effect of the
PGD-robust dataset DR on special architecture designs aim-
ing to gain equivariance against spatial transformations, we
compare the spatial robust accuracy from spatial equivariant
networks trained with the natural dataset D and the robust
dataset DR. Our scope of study includes: (a) G-ResNet18
and G-ResNet34 [4] which use p4m convolutional layers
to replace normal 2D convolution layers in the ResNet-18
and ResNet-34 architectures, resulting in feature maps in-
herently containing rotations in 90◦ increments. We port the
code from [2] in PyTorch into our experiment framework.
(b) Spatial Transformer Networks (STNs) [14], which in-
corporate a pose predictor module in a backbone ResNet
architecture. We adapt the standard STN code from the Py-
Torch STN tutorial [11]. (c) Polar Transformer Networks
(PTNs) [9], an instantiation of Equivariant TransformerNet-
works [22] which exploit the rotational equivariance of con-
volution operations under polar coordinates. We adapt the
code offered in [22].
2.4 Training details
Hyperparameters For experiments about Question 1 we
use batch size 64, a weight decay of 2 ·10−4, and an initial
learning rate of 0.1 which is divided by 10 after 40000 and
60000 iterations for the ResNet-34 model. We train for 100
epochs in total.
For experiments about Question 2 and 3 we use different
hyperparameter settings than for Question 1. In Question 2,
the ResNet-50, ResNet-18 and VGG-16 are trained using a
batch size of 128, a weight decay of 5 ·10−4, and an initial
learning rate of 0.1 which is divided by 10 every 50 epochs.
We train for 150 epochs in total. Due to constraints in com-
putational resources, for Question 3 we tested two learning
rates: 0.1 and 0.01 for the spatial equivariant networks.
Data augmentation We use two variants of data augmen-
tation. We call the first variant std, which performs a trans-
lation of at most 4px in any direction (chosen uniformly at
random), performs a random horizontal flip with probabil-
ity 0.5, jitters the brightness, contrast, and saturation by at
most 25% (chosen uniformly at random), and performs a ro-
tation of at most 2◦ in either direction (chosen uniformly at
random). The second variant, std*, is the same as std, but
performs a translation of at most 3px in any direction and a
rotation of up to 30◦ in either direction.
2.5 Methods
For the three questions proposed in Section 1 we designed
a series of experiments to answer them. We describe the
detailed methods in the following paragraphs.
Method for Question 1 We use a TensorFlow [1] frame-
work [8, 24] to train a ResNet-34 and evaluate the ASRs
for various attacks. In order to examine the claim proposed
in [13] that aiming to achieve a high categorical accuracy in-
troduces adversarial vulnerabilities, we design experiments
to detect the correlation of model natural accuracies and
corresponding ASRs. We train a ResNet-34 model on the
CIFAR-10 training set with std data augmentation for 100
epochs. To observe how ASRs for both PGD attacks and
spatial attacks evolve with model natural accuracy, we eval-
uate them every 4 epochs during the training process of the
model on the full test set of CIFAR-10. We also evaluate ev-
ery 625 steps (equals 0.8 epochs) additionally before reach-
ing the fourth epoch, in order to capture the rapid changes in
natural accuracy and ASR during the beginning of training.
The reason why we use ASR instead of robust accuracy as
an evaluation metric is that it reflects how effective an attack
method is and it rules out the influence of low natural accu-
racy of the model during the early training phase by ruling
out examples which the model can not even make a correct
prediction for in their natural state.
Method for Question 2 We use our framework with std
data augmentation to train the ResNet-50, VGG-16, and
ResNet-18 on Dmix for values of α ∈ [0,1] in 0.1-step incre-
ments and perform the following PGD attacks: (1) we attack
all models with an ℓ2-norm attack constrained by ε = 0.25
and 0.5 (with the learning rate and number of iterations de-
scribed in Section 2.1); (2) we attack the ResNet-50 with
an ℓ∞-norm attack constrained by ε = 1255 ,
2
255 ,
4
255 , and
8
255
(with the step size and number of attack steps described in
Section 2.1).
Method for Question 3 We use our framework to train
the ResNet-50 and the G-ResNet, STN, and PTN (with as
backbones ResNet-18 or ResNet-34). Each of the architec-
tures is trained with std as well as std* data augmenta-
tion. We perform all the spatial attacks listed in Section 2.1
and log the best robust accuracies for each architecture by
searching over the initial learning rates 0.1 and 0.01.
After careful consideration, we discovered that using the
algorithm proposed in [13] to construct DR cannot be used
to construct a spatially robust dataset DSR due to the fact
that doing so would essentially be assigning different la-
bels to the same object in different poses, which would not
help with training. We also did not construct a spatially non-
robust datasetDSNR since after a careful grid search over sev-
eral hyperparameters, we were unable to even achieve the
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results on DNR listed in [13].
Our code framework for studying Question 2 and Ques-
tion 3 is built on the PyTorch [18] robustness library [7].
3 Results
3.1 Answers to Question 1
Figures 1 and 2 show the results of our experiments to de-
terminewhether neural networks “overfit” to non-robust fea-
tures during the later stages of training. We distinguish the
case of spatial vs. PGD attacks.
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Figure 1: Attack success rates of spatial attacks at various training stages.
For spatial attacks For spatial attacks (Figure 1), we
find that the attack success rate (ASR) fluctuates around a
fairly constant rate over the training iterations of the neu-
ral network. The ASR for rot remains around 71-80%, the
ASR for grid135 remains around 84-90%, and the ASR
for grid775 remains around 89-95%. We conclude that in
the case of spatial robustness, neural networks typically do
not make a distinction between spatially robust and spatially
non-robust features during training, instead using all avail-
able features from the very beginning of training.
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Figure 2: Attack success rates of ℓ∞PGD attacks at various training stages.
For PGD attacks Contrary to the case of spatial attacks,
we see a slight upward trend in the ASR when perform-
ing L∞-norm PGD attacks as training progresses through-
out the early stages of training (natural accuracies 60-80%),
as shown in Figure 2. After reaching a natural accuracy of
roughly 80%, ASR fluctuates around a constant level. We
can conclude that at a certain stage of training, the neural
network will start using non-robust features to increase nat-
ural accuracy.
One possible explanation for the difference in results be-
tween spatial and PGD attacks is that spatial attacks are a
substantially different class of attacks than PGD attacks. In
PGD attacks, there is a constraint based on some norm to
limit the attack space, whereas in spatial attacks, the attack
space is controlled by a maximum degree of rotation and
translation.
In both the spatial and the PGD case, it is clear that neu-
ral networks do not specifically over-utilize non-robust fea-
tures during the later stages of training, as ASR remains
fairly constant. We can therefore give the following answer
to Question 1: increasing natural accuracy causes higher
usage of PGD-non-robust features, shown by ASR increas-
ing at the beginning of training. The current goal of optimiz-
ing accuracy to its peak level is therefore partially at fault
for introducing adversarial vulnerabilities to PGD attacks
caused by non-robust features. In the case of spatial robust-
ness, we cannot draw any meaningful conclusion.
3.2 Answers to Question 2
The results of our experiments on the dataset Dmix are sum-
marized in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Left: Robust accuracies of ResNet-50 trained using Dmix for dif-
ferent values of the mix ration α, where α= 0 represents using only natural
images and α= 1 represents using only robust images. Right: Comparison
accuracies of the robust accuracies of ResNet-50, ResNet-18, and VGG-16
trained on Dmix for different values of α. For all attacks, we use the learn-
ing rates from Section 2.1.
Use of Dmix as a defense mechanism We observe a clear
trend that as the mix ration α increases (i.e. the proportion
of images from DR in each training batch increases), the ro-
bust accuracy under all considered attacks increases. It is in-
teresting to note that even adding a small amount of images
from DR (e.g. α = 0 vs. α = 0.1) greatly increases the ro-
bust accuracy, while removing all natural images (α = 0.9
vs. α = 1) greatly reduces the natural accuracy. However,
even having 10% of natural images per batch only decreases
the natural accuracy by around 4% compared to using 100%
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Table 1: Accuracies achieved from the experiments for Question 3. The first row of the table contains natural accuracies, while the remaining rows contain
robust accuracies under the attack mentioned in the leftmost column. Each model has four columns of results: “D” refers to models trained with the natural
dataset, while “DR” refers to models trained with the robust dataset. The notation
∗ indicates the model is trained with std* data augmentation. The
entries reported in this table are the best ones across the backbone ResNet-18/-34 and learning rates. The raw experiment data is logged in Tables 3 and 4.
ResNet-50 G-ResNet STN PTN1
Attack D DR D∗ D∗R D DR D
∗ D∗R D DR D
∗ D∗R –
None 94.84 84.75 93.9 83.53 95.72 85.46 94.74 85.11 94.05 84.39 93.12 83.72 –
rot10 80.97 67.78 83.24 69.67 83.56 69.22 87.61 73.34 84.07 69.52 87.67 73.55 –
rot30 36.77 24.94 58.75 42.62 41.74 26.95 75.38 51.97 41.01 26.4 86.1 70.86 –
grid775,10◦ 63.34 52.3 67.78 55.31 68.17 55.15 75.7 60.38 70.47 54.98 77.01 60.61 –
grid135 18.72 11.23 39.71 26.89 21.84 11.81 56.06 36.64 22.48 11.52 69.47 50.76 –
grid775 15.28 9.88 35.42 24.53 19.36 10.78 53.19 34.57 19.94 10.09 67.47 48.64 –
of natural images. Therefore, using a fixed proportion of im-
ages from DR in each training batch can be considered a
fairly effective defense mechanism.
Transferability among different attacks Ilyas et al.
only consider ℓ2-PGD attacks when evaluating their robust
dataset DR. Figure 3 (left) shows that DR is also robust to
ℓ∞-PGD attacks (provided the attack is not too strong, as
is the case with ε = 8255 ). We conclude that the robustness
induced by DR transfers well among different variations of
PGD attack.
Transferability among different architectures Ilyas et
al. generate the robust dataset DR using a ResNet-50. It
is therefore natural to ask whether their generated dataset
also has similar robustness-inducing effects on other archi-
tectures. Figure 3 (right) shows the results of two differ-
ent ℓ2-PGD attacks on three different architectures. In all
three cases, we observe similar trends to ResNet-50 as α in-
creases. We conclude that a robust dataset generated by one
architecture can be used to induce robustness for another
architecture.
3.3 Answers to Question 3
Table 1 summarizes our results for answering Question 3.
The models are evaluated under various spatial attack meth-
ods. The natural accuracies match baselines in results of
[4, 24]
PGD-robust features do not help boost spatial robust-
ness Ilyas et al. state that training only with the PGD-
robust dataset DR helps the model to obtain a good de-
gree of robustness in general, but our results clearly demon-
strate that this robustness does not apply to the spatial case.
In table 1 we can see that for all architectures, with the
same data augmentation procedure, robust accuracy is much
lower than its natural counterpart for every spatial attack set-
ting.
Spatial equivariant networks induce limited spatial ro-
bustness with DR It has been studied in [24] that several
spatial equivariant designs help to boost spatial robustness
of the models. However, the results we get from training
these specially designed architectures both with D and DR
show that DR does not further improve the robust accuracy,
since all of them do not achieve higher accuracy than when
simply trained with D.
1For the PTN architecture, due to the training instability for getting the
natural accuracy above a meaningful baseline, we omit the results here and
leave the results in the appendix.
4 Discussion
Our work reexamined several ideas proposed in [13] under
a novel perspective. We try to verify the claimed drawback
of the current supervised learning paradigm with a quantita-
tive approach by snapshotting the evolution of the training
procedure and measuring ASRs for various attacks. The re-
sults we get for Question 1 show a general trend, but fail
to further disentangle the effects of robust and non-robust
features on the training process. More experimental designs
and a finer-grained control over the training procedure are
needed for further study.
Furthermore, we proposed a new approach of construct-
ing a training dataset by mixing natural and robust datasets,
which can boost robust accuracy greatly almost without sac-
rificing natural accuracy. Although it could be considered
“robustness for free”, and it transfers well across attacks un-
der the same class as well as different architectures, the ro-
bust accuracy obtained is still below that obtained through
state-of-the-art defenses.
Finally, we empirically disproved the possibility that spa-
tial vulnerabilities are caused by PGD-non-robust features,
but the reason behind such attacks still remains unknown to
us and is out of the scope of this study.
5 Conclusion
In this work,we have studied three questions we raised from
the hypothesis of the existence of robust and non-robust fea-
tures in training data. We first restricted the scope of the
study into a smaller set of attacks, by ruling out spatial at-
tacks through monitoring the evolution of ASR with model
natural accuracy. We found that the goal of maximizing ac-
curacy is partially responsible for inducing PGD vulnera-
bilities, but a similar conclusion cannot be drawn for low-
dimensional attacks. Furthermore, we found that mixing a
certain amount of training examples from the PGD-robust
dataset can boost the PGD-robustness by a great degree
without substantially hurting natural accuracy,which can be
considered as a defense mechanism embedded in the train-
ing dataset. This defense transfers well across various first-
order attack methods and architectures. Finally, we investi-
gated the relationship between the PGD-robust dataset and
spatial equivariant networks and found that it does not help
enhance spatial robustness. We speculate that there are no
“spatially robust features” or “spatially non-robust features”.
This also justifies the no-trade-off phenomenon from [24].
The spatial attack evaluation results, together with the con-
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clusion for Question 1, indicates that we should reexamine
certain theories which are presumed to hold for both do-
mains.
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Appendices
A Omitted experiment results
A.1 PTN-ResNet
Table 2: Natural accuracies for training PTN-ResNet18 and PTN-ResNet34 with initial learning rates (lr) = 0.01 or 0.005, trained with different datasets
and data augmentations.Each model has four columns of results: “D” refers to models trained with the natural dataset, while “DR” refers to models
trained with the robust dataset. The notation ∗ indicates the model is trained with std* data augmentation. We could not get satisfiable natural accuracy
over a reasonable level. Thus, we do not evaluate PTN-ResNet under various spatial attacks and we omit obtained natural accuracy in the main text. We
search over initial learning rates 0.01, 0.005 and we log the best results in this table.
PTN-ResNet18 PTN-ResNet34
D DR D
∗ D∗R D DR D
∗ D∗R
lr=0.01 77.73 63.81 74.03 61.53 73.99 62.25 71.51 58.70
lr=0.005 77.22 66.45 75.04 62.80 74.10 61.9 70.45 58.80
A.2 STN-ResNet raw experiment results
Table 3: Accuracies achieved with STN-ResNet18 and STN-ResNet34 architectures. The first row of the table contains natural accuracies, while the re-
maining rows contain robust accuracies under the attack mentioned in the leftmost column. Each model has four columns of results: “D” refers to models
trained with the natural dataset, while “DR” refers to models trained with the robust dataset. The notation
∗ indicates the model is trained with std* data
augmentation. We search over initial learning rates 0.01, 0.005 and we log the best results in this table.
STN-ResNet-18 STN-ResNet-34
Attack D DR D∗ D∗R D DR D
∗ D∗R
None 93.55 83.75 92.83 83.05 94.05 84.39 93.12 83.72
rot10 83.54 68.66 86.46 73.08 84.07 69.52 87.67 73.55
rot30 38.66 24.98 84.72 68.93 41.01 26.4 86.1 70.86
grid775,10◦ 68.57 54.09 75.08 58.47 70.47 54.98 77.01 60.61
grid135 20.85 11.52 65.41 49.58 22.48 11.04 69.47 50.76
grid775 18.22 9.9 63.48 47.49 19.94 10.09 67.47 48.64
A.3 G-ResNet raw experiment results
Table 4: Accuracies achieved with G-ResNet18 and G-ResNet34 architectures. The first row of the table contains natural accuracies, while the remaining
rows contain robust accuracies under the attack mentioned in the leftmost column. Each model has four columns of results: “D” refers to models trained
with the natural dataset, while “DR” refers to models trained with the robust dataset. The notation
∗ indicates the model is trained with std* data
augmentation. We search over initial learning rates 0.1, 0.01.
G-ResNet-18 G-ResNet-34
Attack D DR D∗ D∗R D DR D
∗ D∗R
None 94.66 85.46 94.74 85.11 95.72 84.93 94.72 84.55
rot10 83.27 69.22 87.42 72.98 83.56 68.8 87.61 73.34
rot30 41.74 26.95 69.86 51.97 41.07 26.08 75.38 46.47
grid775,10◦ 68.17 54.24 75.7 58.96 67.98 55.15 75.7 60.38
grid135 21.84 11.81 52.51 36.64 20.99 10.99 56.06 31.52
grid775 19.36 10.78 49.69 34.57 17.82 9.89 53.19 29.78
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B Training and validation curves while training on Dmix
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